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Abstract: This paper will address the nineteenth-century reception of Bacon as an exponent of 
materialism in Joseph de Maistre and Karl Marx. I will argue that Bacon’s philosophy is “quasi-
materialist.” The materialist components of his philosophy were noticed by de Maistre and Marx, who, in 
addition, pointed out a Baconian materialist heritage. Their construction of Bacon’s figure as the leader of 
a materialist lineage ascribed to his philosophy a revolutionary import that was contrary to Bacon’s actual 
leanings. This contrast shows how different the contexts were within which materialism was conceived 
and valued across the centuries, and how far philosophical and scientific discourses may be transformed 
by their receptions, to the point that in many cases they could hardly be embraced by the authors of these 
discourses. 
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The reception of Francis Bacon has taken place along several paths, that have crossed, 
faced, or ignored each other. As a result, different images of Bacon have emerged, that 
sometimes have little or even nothing to do with each other. Father of experimental 
philosophy, father of empiricism, inductivist, atheist, devoted Christian, eclectic, 
utilitarian, positivist and materialist—these are some of the labels that he has received. 
The figure of Bacon underwent dramatic changes during the nineteenth century. While 
in the seventeenth century he was recognized as one of the most influential novatores, 
and in the Siècle des lumières this recognition reached its climax, by the mid-nineteenth 
century his good philosophical reputation began to fall.1 This turn explains—at least in 
 
1 There are many studies dedicated to the reception of Bacon. Among them are: Paul Dibon, “Sur la 
réception de l’œuvre de F. Bacon en Hollande dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle,” in Marta Fattori 
(ed.), Francis Bacon: Terminologia e fortuna nel XVII secolo, Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1984, pp. 91–




part—why Bacon ultimately remained outside the core of the philosophical canon of 
early modern philosophy that has been predominant over the last two centuries. 
This canon has been shaped in the wake of the “epistemological paradigm,”2 
which postulates that the kernel of true philosophy is the problem of knowledge and 
assumes that during the early modern period philosophers increasingly understood the 
importance of this problem. Rationalism, empiricism and critical philosophy provided 
the early modern responses to the questions on knowledge posed by the revival of 
skepticism during the Renaissance. In the most restricted versions of this traditional 
narrative, Bacon appears as supporting actor in a cast whose leading stars were 
Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz (rationalism), Locke, Berkeley and Hume (empiricism), 
and Kant (critical philosophy).  
This paper will address the nineteenth-century reception of Bacon as an 
exponent of materialism. I will concentrate on two interpretations maintained by 
representatives of the most extremely opposed ideological perspectives at the time: on 
the one hand, the Savoyard Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821), Catholic, prominent anti-
Enlightenment advocate and staunch opponent of the French Revolution; on the other 
hand, the German Karl Marx (1818–1883), scientific socialist and founder of modern 
communism. Of course, their opinions about materialism were quite distinct from each 
other. While de Maistre regretted its subversive impact on the political and religious 
 
pp. 155–178; Richard Yeo, “An Idol of the Market-Place: Baconianism in Nineteenth Century Britain,” 
History of Science 23/3 (1985), pp. 251–298; Michel Malherbe, “Bacon, l’Encyclopédie et la 
Révolution,” Les études philosophiques 3 (1985), pp. 387–404; Antonio Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s 
Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 7–31; Alberto 
Elena, “Baconianism in the Seventeenth-Century Netherlands: A Preliminary Survey,” Nuncius 6/1 
(1991), pp. 33–47; Brian Vickers, “Francis Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 53/3 (1992), pp. 495–518; Graham Rees, “Introduction,” in The Oxford Francis Bacon 
[OFB herafter], vol. XI:  The Instauratio Magna Part II: Novum Organum and Associated Texts, , ed. by 
Graham Rees and Maria Wakely, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, pp. xxii–xxxviii; Chantal Jaquet, 
“Introduction,” in Chantal Jaquet (ed.) L’héritage baconien au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècles, Paris: Kimé, 
2000, pp. 7–16; Dana Jalobeanu, “Four Idols of Baconian Scholarship,” Procedia: Social and Behavioral 
Sciences 71 (2013), pp. 123–130; Dana Jalobeanu, “Francis Bacon, Early Modern Baconians, and the 
Idols of Baconian Scholarship,” Societate și politică 7/1 (2013), pp. 5–27; Alexis Tadié, Francis Bacon: 
Le continent du savoir, Paris: Garnier, 2014, pp. 197–204; Denise Phillips, “Francis Bacon and the 
Germans: Stories from when ‘science’ meant ‘Wissenschaft,’” History of Science 53/4 (2015), pp. 378–
394; Vera Keller, “Deprogramming Baconianism: The Meaning of desiderata in the Eighteenth Century,” 
Notes and Records: the Royal Society Journal of the History of Science 72/2 (2018), pp. 119–137. 
2 On the notion of the “epistemological paradigm” of early modern philosophy see Knud Haakonssen, 
“The History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy: History or Philosophy?,” in Knud Haakonssen (ed.), The 





fields and advocated for the restauration of the monarchic order, Marx wanted to pave 
the way for a materialist interpretation of history whose highest goal was to reach a 
classless society. As we shall see, the preoccupation with the religious consequences of 
materialism was far deeper in de Maistre. 
Despite these obvious ideological differences, de Maistre’s and Marx’s concern 
with materialism had some important points in common that justify a comparative study 
of their receptions of Bacon. In the first place, both authors shared the strategy of 
tracing back the origins of materialism in order to discuss its historical evolution and its 
philosophical and religious significance. Although the texts where they exposed their 
genealogies of materialism were not histories of philosophy, both were permeated by 
the historical approach that gave shape to the institutionalization of philosophy in 
European universities during the nineteenth century.3 In the second place, their 
historical construction of the category “materialism” was part of nineteenth-century 
discourses that linked national European identities with specific philosophical 
“families” or “schools,” often regarded in relation to the major early modern trends 
mentioned above.4 In this context, Bacon was seen as the leader of the English 
philosophical spirit, just as much as Descartes was portrayed as the main voice of the 
French philosophy. Last but not least, and in connection with the former point, de 
Maistre and Marx were deeply engaged with political agendas and were convinced that 
materialism entailed revolutionary political implications.  
Before analyzing de Maistre’s and Marx’s readings,5 I would like to briefly 
discuss to what extent Bacon’s philosophy can be regarded as a materialist philosophy. I 
will argue that Bacon’s philosophy is “quasi-materialist.” This entails that it contains 
some theses that can be regarded as supporting a materialist approach. That is why 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century materialist philosophers shared some tenets with him 
and recognized Bacon as one of their sources or main influences. The materialist 
 
3 On the importance of the literary genre of the history of philosophy in nineteenth-century philosophy, 
see Ulrich Schneider, Philosophie und Universität: Historisierung der Vernunft im 19. Jahrhundert, 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1999. On the category “materialism” in nineteenth-century histories of 
philosophy, see Pierre Daled, Le matérialisme occulté et la genèse du “sensualisme”: Écrire l’histoire de 
la philosophie en France, Paris: Vrin, 2005. 
4 Delphine Antoine-Mahut and Silvia Manzo, “Introduction: Debates on Experience and Empiricism in 
Nineteenth Century France,” Perspectives on Science 27/5 (2019), pp. 643–654; Élodie Cassan (ed.), 
Bacon et Descartes: Genèses de la modernité philosophique, Lyon: ENS Éditions, 2014. 
5 Due to the limited scope of this paper, I will not analyze and criticize the historical (in)accuracy of De 
Maistre’s and Marx’s reconstructions of the materialist lineages and the many exponents included there. I 




components of Bacon’s philosophy were noticed by de Maistre and Marx, who, in 
addition, pointed out a Baconian materialist heritage. Although their interpretations of 
Bacon’s work were sometimes inaccurate, they rightly claimed that Bacon’s philosophy 
provided some seeds that found fertile soil in the full-fledged materialist doctrines 
developed by later generations.  
 
Was Bacon a materialist? 
 
To answer this question, we must first define what we mean by “materialism.” I follow 
Charles Wolfe’s general characterization of materialism as consisting of two basic 
thesis: a) everything that exists is material, or the product of interactions or relations 
between material entities (cosmological thesis); b) every mental phenomenon is a 
corporeal phenomenon or process, or can be reduced to it (psychological thesis).6 True, 
throughout history there have been several variants of materialism.7 However, for the 
aim of this paper it will suffice to start from this general characterization. 
 My interpretation holds that Bacon’s philosophy is quasi-materialist. This means 
that it contains (A) materialist theses and (B) pro-materialist theses, that is, theses 
usually associated with materialist positions.8 However, at the same time, Bacon’s 
philosophy includes (C) non-materialist theses. While the non-materialist theses prevent 
us from describing Bacon’s philosophy as purely materialist, the predominance of 
materialist and pro-materialist theses over the non-materialist ones allows us to call it 
“quasi-materialist.” 
 
A) Materialist theses 
1) Human beings have a sensitive soul that “must clearly be regarded as a 
corporeal substance” (psychological thesis).9 
 
6 Charles Wolfe, “Materialism,” in Aaron Garrett (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century 
Philosophy, London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 99–100; Charles Wolfe, Materialism: A Historico-
Philosophical Introduction, Dordrecht: Springer, 2016, pp. 10–11. 
7 On the varieties of materialism, see Bloch, Le Matérialisme, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1995; Falk Wunderlich, “Varieties of Early Modern Materialism,” British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy 24/5 (2016), pp. 797–813; Charles Wolfe, Lire le matérialisme, Lyon: ENS Éditions, 2020. 
8 Of course, pro-materialist theses could be defended by non-materialist authors. For that reason, I 
described them as theses that were “usually” (not “always and necessarily”) associated with materialist 
positions. 
9 Francis Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, in Works, ed. by James Spedding, Robert L. Ellis and 




2) “[N]othing really exists in nature besides individual bodies, carrying out 
pure, individual acts according to law” (cosmological thesis).10 
 
B) Pro-materialist theses 
1) Matter’s appetites play a central role in physical changes.11 
2) Forms of simple natures—that constitute the highest subject matter of 
natural philosophy—are arrangements of latent corpuscles (and are the laws 
governing their motions).12 
3) Corpuscular matter theory and high opinion of ancient atomism.13 
4) Criticism of the explanatory and operational value of the final causes in 
natural philosophy.14  
5) Commitment to the operational and technological goals of natural science.15  
 
C) Non-materialist theses 
 
1961–1963) [SEH herafter], vol. I, pp. 604–607 (Latin); vol. IV, pp. 396–399 (English). By itself and 
isolated from the rest, this claim—that has a natural philosophical and medical content—can be taken as 
a materialist thesis. However, given that Bacon also affirmed the existence of a rational soul in human 
beings (see C1 below) there is no unanimity among scholars concerning the issue of materialism 
regarding Bacon’s doctrine of the human mind. For a non-materialist reading, see Sorana Corneanu, 
“Francis Bacon on the Motions of the Mind,” in Guido Giglioni, James A.T. Lancaster, Sorana 
Corneanu and Dana Jalobeanu (eds.), Francis Bacon on Motion and Power, Dordrecht: Springer, 2016, 
pp. 201–229. For a materialist reading, see Sophie Weeks, “Francis Bacon’s Doctrine of Idols: A 
Diagnosis of ‘Universal Madness,’” British Journal for the History of Science 52 (2019), pp. 1–39. 
Graham Rees maintains a kind of intermediate position. See Graham Rees, “Francis Bacon’s Biological 
Ideas: A New Manuscript Source,” in Brian Vickers (ed.), Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the 
Renaissance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 297–314. 
10 Francis Bacon, Novum organum, Book 2, Aphorism 2 (OFB XI 202). 
11 Silvia Manzo, Entre el atomismo y la alquimia la teoría de la materia de Francis Bacon, Buenos Aires: 
Biblos, 2006; Guido Giglioni, “Mastering the Appetites of Matter: Francis Bacon’s Sylva Sylvarum,” in 
Charles Wolfe and Ofer Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge, Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2010, pp. 149–167; Silvia Manzo, “The Ethics of Motion: Self-Preservation, Preservation of the 
Whole, and the ‘Double Nature of the Good’ in Francis Bacon,” in Giglioni, Lancaster, Corneanu and 
Jalobeanu (eds.), Francis Bacon on Motion and Power, pp. 175–200. 
12 Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition, p. 91; Silvia 
Manzo, “Francis Bacon and Atomism: A Reappraisal,” in Christoph Lüthy, John Murdoch and William 
Newman (eds.), Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, Leiden, Boston, Köln: 
Brill, 2001, pp. 229–230. 
13 There are many studies on this matter. For a survey, see Manzo, “Francis Bacon and Atomism.” 
14 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, in OFB IV, ed. by Michael Kiernan, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2000, pp. 58–59; Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, SEH I 569–571. 




1) Human beings have a rational soul of an immaterial nature “springing from 
the breath of God.”16 
2) There is a spiritual and providential God governing nature.17 
3) The Adamic Fall is a central episode in the history of mankind and nature. 
The providential account and the Christian history of salvation provides 
legitimation to the reform of learning.18 
 
The materialist theses were not minor but major components of Bacon’s philosophical 
project. The same holds for the other theses. A2, B1,2,3 and C2 were ontological tenets 
through which he conceived nature. B4 had to do with the methodology of the 
investigation of nature. B5 provided the ultimate goals of the Baconian natural science 
and C3 its theological legitimation. Finally, the doctrines on the human soul A1 and C1 
were at the core of his philosophy of mind, his natural philosophy and medicine. They 
serve as a basis for the practical care of the human being in its entirety (body and 
soul).19  
In the following sections, we shall see that de Maistre’s reception of Bacon was 
particularly preoccupied with the doctrines regarding the soul (A1 and C1), the 
reduction of nature to individual bodies (A2), the explanation of what he called 
“physical causes” to the detriment of “final causes” (B4), his sympathies for atomism 
(B3) and his conception of form and matter (B1, B2). In addition, he drew attention to 
the way in which, in his opinion, Bacon distorted the true meaning of the Bible to make 
it compatible with his materialistic views.20 As for Marx, he was not interested in 
 
16 Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, SEH I 604–607. 
17 Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, SEH I 569–571; Bacon, Confession of Faith (SEH VII). 
18 Bacon, Novum organum, Book 2, Aphorism 52 (OFB XI 446); Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, 
OFB IV 34, etc. For a survey of the role played by Adam’s fall in Bacon’s philosophy, see Silvia Manzo, 
“Francis Bacon: la ciencia entre la historia del hombre y la historia de la naturaleza,” Cronos: Cuadernos 
Valencianos de Historia de la Medicina y de la Ciencia 7/2 (2004), pp. 277–346. 
19 Despite the postulation of two kinds of souls, I do not find a clear-cut separation between a natural 
philosophical/medical and a metaphysical/theological perspective on the human mind in Bacon’s 
writings. For solid arguments in defense of this reading, see Sorana Corneanu, “The Nature and Care of 
the Whole Man: Francis Bacon and Some Late Renaissance Contexts,” Early Science and Medicine 22 
(2017), pp. 130–156. 
20 The exclusion of the final causes from physics was one of the most controversial issues in the European 
reception of Bacon across the centuries. Already in the seventeenth century there were critical stances 
about it held by Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, with notes and 
dissertations of Dr. Johann Lorenz Mosheim, 3 vols., London: Thomas Tegg, 1845, vol. II, pp. 605–609 
(first ed. 1678) or Samuel Parker, Disputationes de Deo e providentia divina, Oxford: M. Clark and Jo. 




Bacon’s views on the human soul, but he recovered the nominalism reflected in A2, his 
stances on atomism, forms and matter theory (B1, B2, B3), the explanation in terms of 
“physical” and non-teleological causes (B4) and the operational side of science (B5). 
Both de Maistre and Marx exaggerated the connotations of Bacon’s B4 by interpreting 
it as an absolute separation of natural philosophy from theology. They attributed to him 
a sort of epistemological supremacy of natural philosophy and a sort of opposition 
between “physical” or “natural” causes against “theological” or “final causes.”21 They 
also linked Bacon’s explanation of the origins of ideas in sense-experience as related 
with a materialist approach.22  
 
The counter-revolutionary reception: Joseph de Maistre 
 
Born in Savoy, de Maistre earned law degrees from the University of Turin and served 
as magistrate and senator in Savoy. After the invasion of Savoy by the Napoleonic army 
in 1792, he went into exile (first in Piedmont and then in Lausanne). While living in 
Switzerland, he frequented the literary Salon of Germaine de Staël and engaged in 
counter-revolutionary propaganda. From 1803 onwards, during the post-revolutionary 
era, he spent fourteen years in St. Petersburg as the Piedmondese ambassador to the 
Russian court and continued his legal career. De Maistre was educated with the Jesuits, 
had an excellent library, and read several languages. He had an ample range of 
intellectual interests and became one of the best-read men of his generation. As a 
general attitude, de Maistre had a negative view of the religious, social and moral 
 
philosophy, see Dugald Stewart, “Of the Speculation concerning Final Causes,” in Dugald Stewart, 
Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 2 vols., Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1814, 
vol. II, pp. 453–466, and Pierre-Jean-George Cabanis, Rapport du physique et du moral de l’homme, 
introduction by Louis Peisse, Paris: Bailliere, 1844 (first ed. 1802), pp. 123, 235 note 1; Yeo, “An Idol of 
the Market-Place,” p. 256; Malherbe, “Bacon, l’Encyclopédie et la Révolution,” pp. 99–106. 
21 I will deal with Bacon’s position on this issue below. 
22 The extent to which Bacon’s philosophy can be considered as empiricist deserves a paper on its own. I 
sketched out my interpretation on this issue in Sofía Calvente and Silvia Manzo, “Early Modern 
Empiricism,” in Dana Jalobeanu and Charles Wolfe (eds), Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and 
the Sciences, Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20791-9_588-1. On the association 
between empiricism and materialism, see Charles Wolfe, “Rethinking Empiricism and Materialism: A 
Revisionist View,” Annales Philosophici 1 (2010), pp. 110–123; Daled, Le matérialisme occulté. For 
studies on the nineteenth-century notion of empiricism and Bacon’s reception within this context, see the 
special issue Delphine Antoine-Mahut and Silvia Manzo (eds.), “Debates on Experience and Empiricism 
in Nineteenth Century France,” Perspectives on Science 27/5 (2019) and Silvia Manzo, 
“Historiographical Approaches on Experience and Empiricism in the Early Nineteenth-Century: 




impact of scientific progress. He believed that the spirit of the modern times was 
defined by the “hatred of authority” (be it the authority of God, of the sovereign, or of 
the Pope). This attitude towards authority was initiated by Protestantism and reached its 
highest point in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In response to this, de 
Maistre defended monarchical and papal absolutism, and the supremacy of the Catholic 
religion. 23  
De Maistre could not see in Bacon but the best friend of his worst enemies: the 
French Revolution and Protestantism. Indeed, Bacon had been revered by many 
philosophers that had paved the way for the victory of the French Revolution: the 
philosophers of the Encyclopédie, firstly, and the French idéologues, later. As for the 
Protestant cause, Bacon’s project of human dominion over nature. Puritan and non-
Puritan British intellectuals in the context of a millennial expectation. 24 However, this 
kind of inspiration extended far beyond the limits of British Protestantism and reached 
different geographical areas and religious strains in Europe.25  
The association of Bacon with the revolutionary cause, the defense of freedom 
and the critique of religion was already a matter of debate in nineteenth-century France, 
before de Maistre’s coming into the scene. Bacon was a major and controversial figure 
in the intellectual and political arena. Several authors from opposed bands discussed the 
merits of his work, his religious perspective and his Christian faith, regardless of the 
distinction between Protestantism and Catholicism.26 Those who wanted to free Bacon 
from the accusation of atheism or anti-Christianism were aware that his philosophy was 
regarded as prone to materialism. One of them was Jacques-André Eméry, who, in 
1799, was engaged in vindicating Bacon as a faithful Christian. He argued that although 
Bacon embraced some ideas of ancient atomism, he did not fall either in the materialist 
 
23 On de Maistre’s life and work see Richard Lebrun (ed.), Joseph de Maistre’s Life, Thought, and 
Influence: Selected Studies, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001 and Richard Lebrun, 
“Introduction,” in Joseph de Maistre, An Examination of the Philosophy of Bacon: Wherein Different 
Questions of Rational Philosophy are Treated, ed. and trans. by Richard Lebrun, Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2014, pp. 9–41. 
24 This is the classical thesis maintained by Charles Webster, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine 
and Reform, 1626–1660, second ed., Bern: Peter Lang, 2002. 
25 Due to the limited extension of this paper, I will not discuss here the complex reception of Bacon and 
Baconianism in Puritan and non-Puritan circles. For an interesting recent study from a different approach 
of Bacon’s influence and a discussion of the much debated “Merton thesis” on Puritanism and science, 
see Joel Mokyr, A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2017, ch. 7 and ch. 13. 
26 See Michel Malherbe, “Le christianisme de Bacon,” in Jaquet (ed.), L’héritage baconien au XVIIe et au 




or the atheist camp, since he affirmed that the ultimate principle behind atoms is God.27 
This care for dissociating Bacon from materialism should not come as a surprise. The 
most read Baconian source in pre-revolutionary France, Analyse de la philosophie de 
Bacon (1755) by Alexandre Deleyre, shows Bacon as approving ancient materialism in 
explaining his position on final causes. In a section entitled “De la Métaphysique,” the 
text paraphrases Bacon’s texts very freely and attributes to him the following words: 
“les Matérialistes qui n’ont point apperçu les traces d’une Intelligence supérieure dans 
le gouvernement de l’univers, d’ailleurs connoissoient mieux la nature que la plûpart 
des autres Philosophes qui, voulant suivre la marche de la Providence, lui prêtoient des 
contradictions indignes même de l’homme.”28 Deleyre likely drew on a passage of The 
Advancement of Learning, where Bacon pointed out that “Democritus, and some others” 
did not suppose a divine intelligence ordering the course of nature, and, as a result, their 
philosophies were closer to the truth than Aristotle’s and Plato’s who introduced final 
causes in their accounts.29 Interestingly, Deleyre introduced the label materialists in this 
paraphrasis, a word not used by Bacon and not yet coined at the time he wrote The 
Advancement of Learning.  
Along the same lines as Emery, Jean-André de Luc opposed the attempts to 
secularize Bacon’s philosophy from a revolutionary perspective. In particular, he 
criticized the French translation of Bacon’s corpus promoted by the revolutionary 
government and undertaken by Antoine Lasalle in 1800.30 Lasalle had portrayed Bacon 
as herald of a project of reform of learning leading to the progress of humanity and the 
equality of all men. In that project there is no place for religion. Besides, Lasalle heavily 
intervened in the original text with terminological modifications, additional notes, or 
omission of passages to make the original text compatible with this image of Bacon. De 
Luc strived to counter Lasalle’s picture of the Baconian philosophy and to reinterpret 
those passages where Bacon might be seen irreligious. For instance, de Luc revealed 
Lasalle’s deceitful maneuver of calling “agent universel” what Bacon’s original text 
called “God,” a term denoting a spiritual supreme being, the first cause of the 
 
27 [Jacques-André Emery], Le christianisme de François Bacon, Chancelier d’Angleterre; οu Pensées et 
sentiments de ce grand homme sur la Religion, 2 vols., Paris: Benin, 1799, vol. I, pp. 155–156 note. 
28 Alexandre Deleyre, Analyse de la philosophie du Chancelier François Bacon, 2 vols., Amsterdam: 
Arstkee et Merkus, 1755, vol. I, pp. 72–73. 
29 Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, OFB IV 86. 
30 Francis Bacon, Œuvres de François Bacon, Chancelier d’Angleterre: Avec des notes critiques, 




universe.31 At the same time, de Luc accused Lasalle of making “grands efforts pour 
suppléer cet ÊTRE par quelque cause matérielle.” Even without saying it openly, he 
warned that Lasalle had transformed Bacon into a materialist.32 
 Within this controversial post-revolutionary context, de Maistre underlined the  
association of Bacon with materialism, and above all, the narrative that describes him as 
the initiator of a materialist progeny. His first mentions of Bacon appeared in Les 
soirees de Saint-Petersbourg, composed between 1809 and 1813, and published in 
1831. They expressed relatively moderate judgments and rescued some elements that 
were considered as positive. However, in Examen de la philosophie de Bacon ou l’on 
traite différentes questions de philosophie rationnelle (written between 1814 and 1816; 
published posthumously in 1836) the rejection of Bacon’s philosophy is virulent.33 De 
Maistre not only read Bacon’s main and most famous works, but also lesser-known 
writings. In addition, he engaged in respectfully disproving de Luc’s and Emery’s 
defenses of Bacon’s faith. One important point that distinguishes de Maistre’s concern 
with Bacon’s piety from the earlier French reception mentioned above is the Savoyard’s 
strong defense of Catholicism and his consequent attack on Bacon’s philosophy and its 
materialist followers as products of the emergence of Protestantism.   
One must bear in mind that the main source through which de Maistre accessed 
Bacon’s texts was Lasalle’s revolution-biased translation.34 Therefore, it should not 
come as a surprise that he found materialist doctrines and its dangerous implications. 
The Examen is divided into two volumes. The first one analyzes the Baconian 
methodology—with a strong attack on induction—and his scientific ideas, in particular 
on astronomy, motion, tides, light, and physics in general. Volume two addresses 
Bacon’s doctrines of God, the soul, spontaneous motion, the senses and sensible things, 
the final causes, the principles of the world and matter, the relationship between science 
and religion, and religion.  
 
31 Jean-André de Luc, Précis de la philosophie de Bacon, 2 vols., Paris: Nyon, 1802, vol. II, pp. 155–160. 
32 De Luc, Précis de la philosophie de Bacon, vol. II, p. 124 note. 
33 I will quote the English translation by Richard Lebrun (see note 23) and I will also provide the 
reference to the French edition, Joseph de Maistre, Examen de la philosophie de Bacon ou l’on traite 
différentes questions de philosophie rationnelle, 2 vols., Paris-Lyon: Poussielgue Rusand-Pelagaud, 1836. 
34 Despite the fact that de Maistre’s citations refer to Lasalle’s translation, at least one time he quoted a 




According to de Maistre’s general verdict, two main adjectives best describe 
Bacon’s philosophy: “dangerous” and “useless.”35 Bacon was useless because he made 
no positive contribution to any scientific methodology that may have been put into 
practice by any of the founders of modern science. In fact, de Maistre is one of the first 
critics who attacked Baconian induction in the nineteenth century.36 Furthermore, 
Bacon cannot be regarded as an inventor of successful scientific theories. The few cases 
in which he came close to the truth on scientific matters, he appropriated the ideas of 
others.37 Against Voltaire’s positive assessment of Bacon as a great scientist, de Maistre 
claimed that Voltaire talked about Bacon without having read him.38 
As for Bacon’s dangerousness, de Maistre referred to the terrible religious 
implications of his philosophy. While in several passages of his work Bacon shows 
himself as a faithful believer, de Maistre did not doubt that he was actually a hypocrite. 
In addition, he argued that materialism was not openly affirmed but remained hidden 
behind Bacon’s statements. As the Savoyard says: “every time that Bacon is obscure, 
the meaning is always bad, and clear for the one who has taken the trouble to study his 
miserable philosophy.”39 De Maistre’s insistence on Bacon’s occultation of his impiety 
and his true materialist views is part of a typical way in which anti-materialists 
disqualified their opponents.40 “Materialist” or “atheist” were opprobrious words. Those 
accused of being so were thought to disguise their innermost thoughts and feelings. 
Hence, de Maistre’s argumentative strategy consists in disclosing the occult meaning 
behind Bacon’s words and in pointing out who Bacon’s followers were. As he says: 
“there has not been an atheist, not a materialist, not an enemy of Christianity, in our 
century so fertile in men of this kind, who has not made profession of being their 
 
35 De Maistre, Examination, p. 304 / Examen, vol. II, p. 332. 
36 In the English context T. B. Macaulay criticized Bacon’s induction in 1837. See Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, “Lord Bacon (July 1837),” in Critical and Historical Essays contributed to the Edinburgh 
Review, 3 vols., London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1848, vol. II, pp. 280–429. About 
three decades later, there appeared the influential criticism by the German Justus von Liebig, in Justus 
von Liebig, Ueber Francis Bacons von Verulam und die Methode der Naturforschung, Munich: Cotta, 
1863. For studies on these receptions, see Yeo, “An Idol of the Market-Place,” and Phillips, “Francis 
Bacon and the Germans.” Similar views on Bacon’s ideas were famously held by Alexandre Koyré in the 
twentieth century. See Alexandre Koyré, Études galiléenes, Paris: Hermann, 1966, p. 12, note 4. 
37 De Maistre, Examination, pp. 313–314 / Examen, vol. 2, pp. 354–355. 
38 Also, Macaulay claimed that Bacon was most mentioned than read. Much the same view is maintained 
by scholarly studies Yeo, “An Idol of the Market-Place,” p. 288, and Malherbe, “Bacon, l’Encyclopédie 
et la Révolution.” 
39 De Maistre, Examination, p. 158 / Examen, vol. II, p. 3. 




[Bacon’s and Locke’s] disciple.”41 Bacon’s reputation began with the Encyclopédie and 
its main supporters (Voltaire, Diderot and D’Alembert). He was later commended by 
David Mallet (who in 1755 published La vie de Francois Bacon) and above all by the 
idéologue Cabanis, who in his Rapport du physique et du moral de l'homme (1802) 
depicted his own philosophy as inserted into a lineage begun by Bacon and continued 
by Hobbes, Locke, Helvétius and Condillac.42 
In his disclosing strategy, de Maistre pointed out that Bacon’s views on final 
causes were one of the strongest signs of his hidden materialism. In addition, he related 
this to Bacon’s thesis A2 on cosmological materialism mentioned above:  
 
Final causes or intentions are the torment of modern philosophy, which neglects nothing 
to get rid of them. From this, among other things, comes its great axiom: nature creates 
only individuals.43  
 
Final causes, being the scourge of materialism, modern philosophers, of which Bacon is 
the undisputed chief, have neglected nothing to get rid of an argument that embarrasses 
so strongly the materialists and even the philosophers who, without being materialists 
precisely, still incline more or less towards material doctrines.44  
 
Like many others in the nineteenth century, de Maistre associated empiricism with 
materialism, and thus believed that the empiricist explanation of the origin of the ideas 
involved inevitably a denial of immaterial reality.45 For that reason, he thought that 
Bacon’s explanation of the origin of ideas in sense-experience bears the unequivocal 
mark of materialism. He linked this view with Bacon’s featuring of natural philosophy 
 
41 De Maistre, Examination, p. 306 / Examen, vol. II, p. 338. 
42 De Maistre, Examination, pp. 305–306 / Examen, vol. II, p. 338. Cf. Cabanis, Rapport du physique, pp. 
43–60; 74-78. Cabanis celebrated Bacon’s method, his classification of sciences and arts, and his 
contributions related to medicine. While he referred to Bacon’s position on final causes, he did not—at 
least not explicitly—associate him with materialism. On Cabanis’ reception of Bacon, see Martin S. 
Staum, Cabanis: Enlightenment and Medical Philosophy in the French Revolution, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980. It is interesting to notice that the Scottish reception of Bacon considered that the 
issue of the materiality of the soul was irrelevant for him. See Dugald Stewart, Dissertations on the 
History of Metaphysical and Ethical, and of Mathematical and Physical Science, Edinburgh: Adam and 
Charles Black, 1835, p. 34. 
43 De Maistre, Examination, p. 293 / Examen, vol. II, p. 308. 
44 De Maistre, Examination, p. 237 / Examen, vol. II, p. 179. 




(called physique in de Maistre’s text) as the mother of all sciences.46 The meaning 
intended by Bacon behind his hypocritical words is that natural philosophy (physique) is 
the only science, properly speaking; all real science belongs to it. This exaltation of the 
place of natural philosophy, de Maistre argued, occurs to the detriment of the true 
dignity of theology and metaphysics (the latter being reduced to the study of natural 
bodies).47 To be fair, Bacon’s description of natural philosophy as the mother of all 
sciences appears in the Novum organum and refers to those sciences studying different 
domains of nature (astronomy, medicine, etc.). Within this context, this affirmation does 
not involve a degradation of the particular sciences that do not study nature. Indeed, 
elsewhere Bacon advocated for the continuity among all the scientific branches, 
including theology, human philosophy and natural philosophy. His architectonics of 
science did not delineate a hierarchical or reductionist model.48  
De Maistre attributed to Bacon ideas involving a cosmological materialism: the 
postulation of matter’s inherent motion and the commitment to the atomic constitution 
of matter. He also ascribed to him the affirmation of matter’s eternity. As textual 
evidence of Bacon’s defense of the eternity of matter, de Maistre quoted long passages 
from De principiis atque originibus. Although in this work Bacon very explicitly 
embraced the creation of matter ex nihilo by God, as testified in the Holy Writ, de 
Maistre indicated that Bacon actually denied this dogma, in the following passage: “[in 
the Scriptures] it is not written that God in the beginning created matter, but that He 
created the Heaven and the Earth.”49 Indeed, de Maistre claimed that Bacon pretended 
to assimilate the “language” of the Bible to the pagan atomist theory and disregarded the 
enormous differences between them.50 As we shall below, he blamed Bacon for 
misreading the Scriptures on various occasions and judged such operations a sign of 
intentionally concealed impiety.  
As for psychological materialism, de Maistre stated that while “[e]very line of 
Bacon leads to materialism,” none are more telling of this “dangerous hypocrite” than 
 
46 Bacon, Novum organum, Book 1, Aphorism 79 (OFB XI 125): “Yet this same [natural] philosophy 
should be regarded as the great mother of the sciences.” 
47 De Maistre, Examination, pp. 157–159 / Examen, vol. II, pp. 2–5. 
48 Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, OFB IV 76; De augmentis scientiarum, SEH I 540–541; IV 337. 
49 De Maistre, Examination pp. 220–222 / Examen, vol. II, pp. 139–146. See Francis Bacon, De principiis 
atque originibus, in OFB VI, ed. by Graham Rees and Michael Edwards, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, 
pp. 208–211, 250–253. 




those he devoted to the human soul.51 I will focus on his treatment of this issue to 
provide a sample of his strategy of “making visible” the materialism “hidden” in 
Baconian doctrines and showing their impact on materialist philosophers. In the first 
place, he argued that, by restricting the task of philosophy to the study of the sensitive 
soul and by discarding the research into the rational soul, the main goal pursued by 
Bacon was to establish that human reason can only know “matter” and what stems from 
“elementary matters.”52 In the second place, de Maistre blamed Bacon for placing all 
the mental faculties in the sensitive soul and eliminating the rational soul from the 
explanation of mental processes, as if it did not exist at all. In this way, the higher 
faculties—such as “understanding”—were placed on the same level as the lower ones—
such as “appetite.” These assessments led de Maistre to point out that Locke’s, 
Condillac’s and Cabanis’s materialist views of the mental faculties stemmed from 
Bacon’s doctrine of the soul. He found an evolution of psychological materialism in 
Bacon’s progeny. The summit was reached by Cabanis for whom the soul was nothing 
but a faculty of the body. Not a single word spoken by Bacon passed by without being 
redoubled by the spirit of the eighteenth century—bitterly regrets de Maistre .53 
The most alarming fact, in de Maistre’s opinion, is that Bacon appealed to the 
book of Genesis to legitimize his distinction between two kinds of soul, thus distorting 
the true meaning of the Biblical text. The center of de Maistre’s rebuttal of Bacon’s 
misuse of the Bible consists in explaining how the passages invoked by him should be 
interpreted and in exhibiting passages opposing a materialist view of the soul. The 
verses “Let the waters bring forth! Let the earth bring forth!” are taken by Bacon as 
attesting the creation of the sensitive soul, while the creation of the rational soul is 
indicated by the lines stating that God “breathed into his face the breath of life.”54 
Against Bacon’s reading, de Maistre argued that the first sentence refers to the creation 
of the physical world, not of man. Besides, the verse “Let us make man to our image 
and likeness,”55 which clearly means that the soul by which man resembles God is 
immaterial, is entirely omitted in Bacon’s text. In addition, de Maistre refuted the 
 
51 De Maistre, Examination, p. 172 / Examen, vol. II, pp. 33–46. For a refutation of the reading of Bacon 
as a psychological materialist in nineteenth-century France, see Charles de Remusat, Bacon: Sa vie, son 
temps, sa philosophie et son influence jusqu’à nos jours, Paris: Didier, 1857, p. 281. 
52 De Maistre, Examination, p. 178 / Examen, vol. II, pp. 47–48, italics in the original. 
53 De Maistre, Examination, pp. 179–180 / Examen, vol. II, pp. 49–51. 
54 Gen. I, 20, 24; II, 7; Bacon, De augmentis, SEH I 604–605. 




separation of the two kinds of soul postulated by Bacon, by noting that the divine breath 
constitutes the only soul that gives life to the human body. With respect to this point, he 
believed that Bacon distorted the passage that mentions the divine breath by identifying 
it with only one kind of soul and by pretending that the slime denotes the whole man 
and not just his body.56 De Maistre also detected another important omission here: the 
book of Genesis adds that thanks to the divine breath “man became a living creature (or 
soul).” 57 This phrase, he argued, is a clear indication that the human soul is the only 
one that gives life to the human being without needing the assistance of a sensitive soul.    
 Driven by his defense of Catholicism and the conviction that Protestantism 
inaugurated the period of decadence culminating in the French Revolution, de Maistre 
characterized Bacon’s way of misusing and misrepresenting the sacred text as an 
instance of the common hermeneutic practice of Protestantism. In this context, Bacon’s 
novelty would consist in employing it in favor of materialism. His materialist turn is all 
the more damaging as his followers continued that path. The Baconian operation of 
“remaking the human understanding” resembles the Protestant operation of “remaking 
Christianity”: both despise and humiliate all that preceded them. However, even though 
they claim otherwise, they strictly have  nothing new to offer but only negative views.58 
The parallelism that de Maistre established between Baconianism and Protestantism 
shows the extent to which he judged that Bacon’s philosophy was a clear enemy of 
Catholicism, as it was a philosophy produced in the wake of the Reformation, whose 
long-reaching impact extended up to the nineteenth century. In de Maistre’s words: “His 
philosophy resembles this religion, which protests continually: it is entirely negative 
and thinks only to contradict.”59 It was this spirit of contradiction that led straight to the 
political Revolution and to the undermining of the Catholic religion. 
 
The place of Bacon in Marx’s history of materialism  
 
It will come as no surprise that what for de Maistre was a motive of scandal, for Marx 
was a ground for approval. In chapter VI of The Holy Family (1844), a young Marx, 
still close to Feuerbach’s philosophy, presented a genealogy of eighteenth-century 
 
56 De Maistre, Examination, pp. 313–314 / Examen, vol. II, pp. 354–355. 
57 De Maistre, Examination, p. 176 / Examen, vol. II, p. 44, italics in the original. 
58 De Maistre, Examination, p. 178, note 20 / Examen, vol. II, p. 46 note 1. 




French materialism.60 This narrative constitutes a kind of proto-history of philosophical 
materialism, twenty years before the publication of Albert Friedrich Lange’s famous 
Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart (1866).61 
The target of this section is Bruno Bauer, one of the members of “the Holy Family” of 
the Young Hegelians, which Marx and Engels aimed to desacralize in this book.  
More specifically, Marx criticized an article where Bauer engaged in a “critical 
history of French materialism.”62 To counter Bauer’s narrative, Marx offered a brief 
outline of the “profane history” of materialism,63 as opposed to the “sacred history” 
proposed by the Young Hegelian. Marx’s main reproach to Bauer’s history is that he 
interpreted the dispute between materialism and anti-materialism within an exclusively 
speculative framework, by taking Spinozism as the main point on discussion. Instead, 
Marx’s historiographical construction argued that eighteenth-century French 
materialism resulted from the confluence of two sources: 1) the mechanical materialism 
initiated by Descartes’s physics and 2) the English materialism promoted by Locke and 
ultimately initiated by Bacon. The waters of both sides would eventually flow into 
socialism and communism.64  
Unlike de Maistre’s, Marx’s text is very brief and is not exclusively concerned 
with Bacon. This section of The Holy Family is the only text in which he provided an 
account of the history of early modern philosophy at some length. On other occasions 
he only made short and incidental mentions of the topic. Marx had no interest in the 
history of philosophy by itself. His concern with the history of materialism in this text is 
motivated by his general goal of distancing himself from the Young Hegelians. As a 
result, he developed an alternative way of understanding materialism, which, assuming 
the historicist pattern established by Hegelianism, gives shape to a materialist 
conception of history. 
 
60 The Holy Family was a text written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. We know that the section 
devoted to the history of materialism was authored by Marx alone. See Olivier Bloch, “Marx, Renouvier 
et l’histoire du matérialisme,” La Pensée 191 (1977), pp. 3–42, at pp. 4–5. I will quote the English 
translation: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family, in Collected Works of Marx and Engels, 
vol. 4, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975. 
61 For a brief comparison of Marx’s and Lange’s histories of materialism, see Bloch, Le matérialisme, ch. 
2. 
62 See Bruno Bauer, “Was ist jetzt der Gegenstand der Kritik? (Juni 1844),” in Bruno Bauer, Feldzüge der 
reinen Kritik, epilogue by Hans Martin Sass, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968, pp. 200–212. 
63 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, pp. 143–144. 




While a few years earlier, in the doctoral dissertation presented at the University 
of Jena in 1841, Marx asked himself about the differences between the natural 
philosophies of Democritus and Epicurus and drew on Hegel’s Lectures on the History 
of Philosophy, in The Holy Family he blamed Bauer for relying in his account on the 
Hegelian narrative.65 Accordingly, in The Holy Family he drew on other sources to 
write his brief history. Olivier Bloch has found irrefutable evidence that Marx employed 
the recently published Manuel de philosophie moderne (1842) of Charles-Bernard 
Renouvier.66 Marx himself said that he collected “things already known,” which can be 
found “in most recent French histories of philosophy.”67 Renouvier noticed, on the one 
hand, the connection of French materialism with Descartes and Locke, and, on the other 
hand, the eighteenth-century opposition to the metaphysics of the seventeenth century. 
While these connections had been already noted by existing histories, Marx claimed that 
further research is needed in order to complete this history and to explain the link of 
early modern materialism with nineteenth-century French and English communism. To 
fill this gap, Marx quoted Helvétius’s, D’Holbach’s and Bentham’s writings.68 Only that 
in these cases he seems to have read the original sources themselves. 
As Bloch points out, although “a considerable part” of The Holy Family’s 
history of materialism borrows extensively from Renouvier’s Manuel, this does not 
entail that there is nothing original written by Marx’s hand in this text.69 Marx did not 
limit himself to merely repeating and passively reproducing this source. On the 
contrary, he extracted from Renouvier what he regarded as the most suitable elements to 
build his own narrative. This was not only appropriation or copy-paste, but also creative 
work. In the first place, Marx created the narrative that distinguishes the two 
orientations leading to eighteenth-century French materialism. In the second place, he 
 
65 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 131. Bloch, “Marx, Renouvier et l’histoire du matérialisme,” p. 
5. 
66 Charles Renouvier, Manuel de philosophie moderne, Paris: Paulin, 1842. In addition, Bloch provided 
convincing arguments for discarding Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s historical works as main sources of Marx’s 
account of the history of materialism. See Bloch, “Marx, Renouvier et l'histoire du matérialisme,” pp. 7–
8. It is interesting to note, however, that in a text that Marx could not have ignored, Ludwig Feuerbach 
maintained that Bacon’s philosophy contained the “spirit of materialism” (Geist des Materialismus) as it 
would unfold later. See Ludwig A. Feuerbach, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie von Bacon von 
Verulam bis Benedikt Spinoza, Ansbach: Brügel, 1833, pp. 41–42. 
67 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 132. 
68 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 152, note. Marx also alluded to “a French writer” when 
commenting on the place of Pierre Bayle in the history of early modern philosophy (The Holy Family, p. 
146). 




introduced the connection with nineteenth-century communism, showing parallels 
between the two historical periods. Most importantly, the fundamental innovation of 
Marx’s narrative lies in delineating the rudiments of the materialist conception of 
history that was beginning to take shape at this stage of his intellectual career. These 
rudiments both articulate the theoretical with the practical level of history and feature 
the history of materialism in terms of a dynamic progression of oppositions. While in 
Renouvier the practical aspect of history is simply parallel with the theoretical one, in 
Marx it is its condition. 
It must be added that Marx set aside the ideological bias that permeated 
Renouvier’s manual. Renouvier was educated at the Polytechnic School and received 
influences from Saint Simon and Comte. According to Bloch, his political ideology can 
be placed in the center-left, while his philosophical position combines non-Cousinian 
eclecticism with socialist ideas.70 From this perspective, Renouvier’s opinion of 
materialism is negative. For instance, unlike Marx, he thought that Diderot’s and La 
Mettrie’s ideas were harmful to the French society. Apparently, Marx believed that 
although every history is an ideological construction, this does not impede that the 
“factual” bits that it provides may be extracted and assembled in order to write 
alternative or even ideologically antagonistic narratives. It is as if histories contained 
factual elements that are “true” and ideologically neutral in themselves. The same 
“neutral historical facts” may be read from different ideological points of view. For 
instance, regardless of Renouvier’s political and philosophical orientation, Marx took 
from his history the “true” fact that Bacon was the “father” of English materialism and 
put it into his own account of early modern philosophy in the light of the materialist 
conception of history. 71  
Marx begins by a quotation from Bauer stating that the fate of the philosophy of 
the eighteenth century was to end in Romanticism after having been dominated by 
Spinoza’s philosophy. Within this narrative, two schools discussed the true meaning of 
Spinoza’s system. The French school held that Spinoza “made matter into substance,” 
and the deist school “conferred on matter a more spiritual name.”72 Against this “holy 
 
70 Bloch, “Marx, Renouvier et l’histoire du matérialisme,” pp. 28, 22–24. 
71 We know that this judgement is quite incorrect. The first well-known figure to endorse a full-fledged 
materialism in England was Thomas Hobbes. Contemporary to him was Margaret Cavendish’s 
materialism, a philosopher a couple of decades younger than him, who was ignored by traditional 
narratives and has been gaining visibility in the last decades. 




critical history,” Marx’s “profane history” maintains that the fight of eighteenth-century 
French philosophy, and especially of French materialism, had two different targets, one 
theoretical and another practical. At the practical level it fought against political, 
religious and theological institutions. At the theoretical level it opposed the metaphysics 
of the seventeenth century represented by Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza and 
Leibniz. Marx characterized this theoretical confrontation as the opposition between 
materialist philosophy and metaphysics.73 
In turn, Marx assimilated this confrontation with Feuerbach’s combat against the 
“wild” Hegelian speculation that dominated German philosophy in the nineteenth 
century. The latter, according to Marx, was nothing but a restoration of seventeenth-
century metaphysics, which Hegel masterly fused with all subsequent metaphysics and 
with German idealism, thus producing a “metaphysical universal kingdom.”74 Marx’s 
dialectical interpretation of the evolution of metaphysics foresees that, after its Hegelian 
restoration, metaphysics will “succumb forever.” Just as he distinguished the practical 
from the theoretical targets of eighteenth-century materialism, with respect to 
nineteenth-century philosophical antagonism, Marx distinguished Feuerbach’s 
theoretical battle in Germany from the practical battle sustained by French and English 
socialism and communism. 
After this general presentation of the main paths of materialism, Marx delineated 
the two “orientations” that gave life to the French materialism of the eighteenth century. 
One of them is the “mechanical materialism” that, starting in Descartes’s physics, 
extended up to the French natural sciences. Fundamental to understanding this 
association of Cartesianism with materialism is the Marxian postulation of a stark 
separation between physics and metaphysics inside the Cartesian program. Although 
this divide is not openly stated by Renouvier, it can be inferred from his postulation of 
the existence of “two halves” in the Cartesian system, as if they were compartments that 
 
73 Marx’s earlier reception of Spinoza (ca. 1841–1844) contrasts with his stance in The Holy Family, 
where Spinoza is inserted in a metaphysical tradition that Marx wanted to combat. However, in the 1960s 
Louis Althusser assumed that Spinoza was “the only direct ancestor of Marx” and interpreted Spinozism 
as a materialist philosophy (Louis Althusser, Étienne Balibar, Lire le Capital, vol. I, Paris: F. Maspero, 
1996, p. 128. First ed. 1968). Due to the limited scope of this article, it is not possible to offer here a 
detailed examination of this much studied and debated question. For a recent survey and an interpretation, 
see Bernardo Bianchi, “Marx’s Reading of Spinoza: On the Alleged Influence of Spinoza on Marx,” 
Historical Materialism 26/4 (2018), pp. 35–58. 




can be separated and understood “independently of each other.”75 In this way, Descartes 
maintained that the only substance belonging to physics is matter, the foundation of 
being and of knowing. If physics has no ties to metaphysics, material activity can only 
come from matter itself. This is how we can understand why Marx—following 
Renouvier—stated that Cartesian physics “endowed matter with self-creative power and 
conceived mechanical motion as the manifestation of its life.”76 The French materialist 
school followed the path of Decartes’s mechanical physics in opposition to his 
metaphysics. Marx seems to point out that it was the pre-existing anti-metaphysical 
attitude which they had “by profession” that led them to embrace Cartesian 
mechanicism. Among them, Marx highlighted Regius (Le Roy), La Mettrie and 
Cabanis. On the other hand, Marx pointed out that as early as the seventeenth century 
there were materialists who opposed the metaphysics of Descartes, such as Gassendi 
and Hobbes—both taking up ideas of the ancient atomism of Democritus and 
Epicurus.77   
Marx’s narrative is akin to his materialist view of history, according to which the 
imposition of theoretical materialism was made possible by the anti-metaphysical and 
anti-theological practice that characterized the eighteenth-century intellectual French 
atmosphere. In this reading, Marx evoked a thought he attributed to Voltaire. Thus, the 
primacy of being over thinking explains historical changes. For that reason, metaphysics 
came to an end at the time when the replacement of Malebranche and Arnauld by 
Helvétius and Condillac began. Again, Marx argued that there is a parallel between 
early modern materialism and that of his own time. Pierre Bayle and Feuerbach in each 
period are the main actors who provoked the fall of the metaphysics of their time. Both 
began by questioning theology and later ended up by definitively objecting to 
metaphysics. In particular, Bayle’s criticism of theology led to the idea of a society of 
atheists, somehow foreseeing the events that would soon occur in France.78   
The place of Bacon in this history appears, as noted above, in the English 
materialist school. Despite the fact that the school is said to take its form as an anti-
metaphysical philosophy thanks to Locke’s contribution, Bacon is later described as the 
 
75 Renouvier, Manuel de philosophie moderne, pp. 342–343. 
76 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 125. 
77 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, pp. 125–126. 




“real progenitor” of this school.79 The theoretical body contained in Locke’s Essay on 
Human Understanding (1690) was necessary to give systematic form and foundation to 
the materialist practice. Far from being the fruit of Spinozism, materialism is “the 
natural-born son of Great Britain.”80 The first signs of English materialism are found in 
the nominalism of Duns Scotus and Ockham, which reappeared in Bacon and Hobbes. 
This connection between nominalism and materialism is borrowed from Renouvier’s 
account, and fully agrees with the cosmological claim of Bacon’s thesis A2 (“[N]othing 
really exists in nature besides individual bodies, carrying out pure, individual acts 
according to law”).81 
In this context it raises the question of the possibility of thinking matter. In this 
peculiar account of materialism, Marx presents Bacon’s philosophy as follows: 
 
The real progenitor of English materialism and all modern experimental science is 
Bacon. To him natural philosophy is the only true philosophy, and physics based upon 
the experience of the senses is the chiefest part of natural philosophy. Anaxagoras and 
his homoeomeriae, Democritus and his atoms, he often quotes as his authorities. 
According to him the senses are infallible and the source of all knowledge.82 All science 
is based on experience, and consists in subjecting the data furnished by the senses to a 
rational method of investigation. Induction, analysis, comparison, observation, 
experiment, are the principal forms of such a rational method. Among the qualities 
inborn [eingeborner] in matter, motion is the first and foremost, not only in the form of 
mechanical and mathematical motion, but chiefly in the form of an impulse, a vital 
spirit, a tension [Trieb, Lebensgeist, Spannkraft] or a “Qual”—to use a term of Jakob 
Böhme’s—of matter.83 The primary forms of matter are the living, individualising 
 
79 This judgement was repeated in the twentieth century in the influential Marxist interpretation of 
Benjamin Farrington, Francis Bacon: Philosopher of Industrial Science, London: Lawrence and Wishert, 
1951, preface to the English edition. On the Marxist reception of Bacon, see Ladis Kristof, “Francis 
Bacon and the Marxists: Faith in the Glorious Future of Mankind,” in G. L. Ulman (ed.), Society and 
History: Essays in Honor of Karl August Wittfogel, The Hague: Mouton, 1978, pp. 233–257, and Keller 
“Deprogramming Baconianism,” pp. 122–123. 
80 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 127. 
81 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 128; Renouvier, Manuel de philosophie moderne, p. 321. 
82 Bacon did not have this blind confidence in the senses. He claimed that “the sense fails us in two ways: 
for it either deserts or deceives us.” He proposes helps for the senses to remedy this situation 
(experiments and instruments). See Francis Bacon, Distributio operis, OFB XI 33. 
83 In a recent study, Erik van Ree points out that this description of Baconian matter as an inherently 
active and self-moving entity agrees with Marx’s conception of an impassionate, self-creative nature. See 
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forces of being inherent in it and producing the distinctions between the species. […] In 
Bacon, its first creator, materialism still holds back within itself in a naive way the 
germs of a many-sided development. On the one hand, matter, surrounded by a 
sensuous, poetic glamour, seems to attract man’s whole entity by winning smiles. On 
the other, the aphoristically formulated doctrine pullulates with inconsistencies imported 
from theology.84  
 
We know that Marx read several of Bacon’s works (at least De augmentis 
scientiarum, History of Henry VII, Essays).85 By 1837 he had read De augmentis 
scientiarum, apparently in the original Latin. He referred to Bacon’s account of the 
separation of physics from theology in an article published in the Kölnische Zeitung in 
1842, by paraphrasing a passage from this book. In so doing he anticipated one of the 
claims introduced a few years later in The Holy Family: “Bacon of Verulam said that 
theological physics [theologische Physik] was a virgin dedicated to God and barren; he 
emancipated physics from theology and it became fertile.”86 
That notwithstanding, the portrayal of Bacon in the Holy Family is heavily 
indebted to Renouvier’s account. The description of Bacon as “first creator” and 
progenitor suggests the existence of a latent materialism in his philosophy, which was 
later manifested in his progeny. This interpretation can be recognized in several 
passages of Renouvier’s Manuel, that do not attribute materialism directly to Bacon, but 
to those who relied on his philosophy. Thus, for example, Renouvier maintained that 
Bacon’s school ends in materialism and almost in atheism.87 Furthermore, he 
 
84 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 128. Translation slightly modified. Cf. Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), vol. 1/4, pp. 828–829. 
85 In a letter to his father of November 1837, Marx mentioned that he read De augmentis scientiarum (see 
Collected Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 1, Karl Marx 1835–1843, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975, 
p. 19). In addition, references to the Essays and The History of King Henry the Seventh are found in The 
Capital, Book I, ch. 27. The German Ideology (1845) mentions passages from Hegel’s Vorlesungen über 
die Geschichte der Philosophie (Part III, Section 1.A) dealing with Bacon. See Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels, The German Ideology, in Collected Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 5, London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1975, pp. 172–173. 
86 Karl Marx, Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung (July 14th, 1842), in Collected Works of 
Marx and Engels, vol. 1, p. 191; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), vol. 1/1, 
Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1975, p. 188. 
Cf. Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, SEH I 571: “Causarum finalium inquisitio sterilis est, et tanquam 
virgo a Deo consecrata nihil parit.” 
87 Renouvier, Manuel de philosophie moderne, p. 40: “En fin, toute philosophie fondée sur les senses et 
l’observation avait l’immense défaut ou de n’embrasser guère que les sciences naturelles, et de laisser, 
par conséquent, la métaphysique entre les mains de l’autorité […], ou de conclure au matérialisme et 




considered that in Bacon there is a “contempt” for contemplation and pure 
understanding, and a preference for action. This attitude is said to be both the root of 
England’s “industrial greatness” and also of its “materialism” and “moral despair.”88  
Renouvier echoed the French controversies on Bacon of his time and even 
mentioned de Maistre.89 Like de Maistre, he thought that empiricism was strongly 
connected with materialism. Bacon’s philosophy is said to be based “in the senses and 
observation” and to have “the great flaw” of every empiricist approach: to end in 
materialism and almost in atheism.90 But, unlike de Maistre, he was not preoccupied 
with a defense of Catholicism, believed that Bacon’s philosophy was “eminently 
religious,” and he kept a respect for metaphysics. In Bacon, the legitimate goals of 
natural science are imposed by the Biblical revelation. This religious and metaphysical 
commitment does not entail, however, an impediment to a reduction of knowledge to 
physical causes. For, according to Renouvier, Bacon was firmly engaged in reducing 
every philosophy to natural philosophy.91    
The same interpretative pattern is reproduced by Marx. In Bacon there is a 
conjunction of empiricism and a reduction of every knowledge to physical causes. They 
together paved the way to the materialism fully developed by his followers. Like 
Renouvier, Marx stated that Hobbes was the author who systematized Bacon’s 
materialism for the first time and purified it from his “theist” elements (related to the 
theses C of my reconstruction). Taking up the Baconian principle according to which all 
knowledge has its origin in sense-experience, Hobbes materialized everything: ideas, 
perceptions, the words and their meanings, the human passions, power and freedom. 
Later on, Locke supplied “proof for Bacon’s fundamental principle,” namely “the origin 
of all human knowledge and ideas from the world of sensation.”92 Locke’s British 
followers (Collins, Dodwell, Coward, Hartley and Priestley) eliminated all the 
theological and metaphysical residue found in his system, in order to develop a full-
fledged anti-metaphysical position. It is interesting to notice that, perhaps because he 
 
88 Renouvier, Manuel de philosophie moderne, p. 150: “Dans ce mépris de Bacon par la science pure, qui 
cependent élève l’intelligence de l'homme vers la divinité, on reconnaît la source de la grandeur 
industrielle et aussi celle du matérialisme et du désespoir moral en Angleterre.” 
89 Renouvier, Manuel de philosophie moderne, pp. 36 note 2, 133. 
90 Renouvier, Manuel de philosophie moderne, p. 150. 
91 Renouvier, Manuel de philosophie moderne, pp. 139–141. 




wanted to highlight the English character of this materialist school, Marx deliberately 
omitted Gassendi, who was included among Bacon’s followers in Renouvier’s history.93  
With regard to the impact of the English Baconian materialist school in France, 
Marx claimed that French authors “civilized” English materialism, by introducing into it 
the eloquence, the grace and the temperament of their nation. Condillac was the one 
who endorsed “Locke’s sensualism” to refute the metaphysics of Descartes, Spinoza, 
Leibniz and Malebranche. This path was also endorsed and deepened by Helvétius, La 
Mettrie and D’Holbach. While the first one applied the foundations of materialism to 
the social life, the latter two integrated the English approach with Cartesian mechanical 
physics, developing materialist physics and morality. This is how this line feeds the 
ideas of nineteenth-century socialism and communism. 
Why was important for Marx to define the figure of Bacon as “the real 
progenitor of English materialism and all modern experimental science”? I think that the 
young Marx valued Bacon’s philosophy as the first historical model of the articulation 
of theory and praxis the Marxian political agenda was tending to: a materialist 
conception of being that conceived matter as a self-moving and active entity (theory) 
plus the promotion of the transformation of the material conditions of life through 
human intervention on nature (praxis). Several years later, in his mature work, Capital 
(1867), Marx emphasized this latter aspect of materialism and celebrated the 
philosophical projects of the two initiators of the early modern materialist strains, Bacon 
and Descartes, for they “anticipated an alteration in the form of production, and the 





93 Another nineteenth-century French historian that noted the ties of Gassendi to Bacon was Joseph-Marie 
Degérando, who placed Gassendi before Locke in “line of the succession” of the Baconian school. Given 
the dominance of the epistemological paradigm, these ties were for a long time disregarded by the 
scholarship. See Joseph-Marie Degérando, Histoire comparée des systêmes de philosophie, relativement 
aux principes des connaissances humaines, 3 vols., Paris: chez Henrichs, 1804, vol. II, pp. 366–367; 
Silvia Manzo, “Empirismo y filosofía experimental. Las limitaciones del relato estándar de la filosofía 
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Like all receptions, the nineteenth-century reception of Bacon was determined by the 
anxieties, interests and ideologies of those who revered, criticized or condemned him. 
To use Brian Vickers’s words, the many facets ascribed to Bacon and the different 
trends of Baconianism are “mirrors of each age.”95 For many post-revolutionary actors, 
the debate on materialism was a key issue. That is why the Baconian philosophy was 
interpreted in light of it. Authors of different persuasions searched in that rich 
philosophy for what could serve to enforce their positions in intellectual debates and/or 
political crusades. What was primarily at stake were not so much the new ways of 
gaining knowledge, but above all the new forms of political organization, and the 
cultural crisis that the bourgeois European society was experiencing.  
Against this background, de Maistre and Marx made ideological use of Bacon’s 
thought for the benefit of their own agendas. They portrayed Bacon, for better or worse, 
as the father of materialism and placed him at the beginning of a materialist lineage 
which had not only theoretical, but also practical significance. While Marx’s historical 
materialism claimed that the practical fight against religion was the cause of the 
theoretical construction of French materialism, de Maistre’s approach claimed that it 
was precisely the nefarious materialist ideas that lead to the political, moral and 
religious troubles of the Revolution of 1789. For that reason, their reception 
transformed the meaning of Bacon’s materialist theses by reading them from a 
perspective that was alien to Bacon. While Bacon’s materialist theses were related to 
natural philosophy and the philosophy of mind, de Maistre and Marx attributed to them 
dimensions neither envisaged nor wanted by their author. Indeed, their construction of 
Bacon’s figure as the leader of a materialist lineage ascribed to his philosophy a 
revolutionary import that was contrary to Bacon’s actual leanings, who defended the 
status quo and was far from promoting political upheavals or religious dissidence. This 
contrast shows how different the contexts were within which materialism was conceived 
and valued across the centuries, and how far philosophical and scientific discourses may 
be transformed by their receptions, to the point that in many cases they could hardly be 
embraced by their authors.  
 
95 Brian Vickers, “Francis Bacon Mirror of Each Age,” in J. Heilborn (ed.), Advancements of Learning: 




Both de Maistre and Marx (and Renouvier) characterized Bacon’s materialism 
as a kind of proto-materialism, a materialism at a primitive and rudimentary stage.96 
According to de Maistre’s harsh criticism, Bacon’s materialism was deliberately 
clandestine, and was part of his general strategy of concealment, hypocrisy and 
deception. From his perspective, Bacon did not want to show who he really was. 
Therefore, the evil power enclosed in his writings could hardly be glimpsed. It became 
fully evident long after in the work of his followers, and in the political effects of his 
dangerous ideas. For Marx, Bacon’s philosophy contains a latent materialism that others 
developed to its full power, by deriving all the positive consequences of its empirical 
principle, and by liberating it from religious and metaphysical residue.  
Friedrich Albert Lange, in his Geschichte des Materialismus (1873), endorsed a 
similar view. He argued that Bacon could be considered the true “restorer of the 
materialist philosophy.” Lange claimed that it is by chance that “only in the eighteenth 
century” did the word materialism appear for the first time,97 since the essence of this 
approach was already contained in Bacon’s philosophy. The only thing that would keep 
us from calling him materialist, Lange argued, is the fact that Bacon devoted himself 
mainly to methodological issues and maintained an ambivalent reservation on the most 
important issues (possibly Lange refers to the soul and the final causes). If Bacon 
admitted the existence of the anima rationalis, it was only on religious grounds, since 
he explained all the psychological functions by referring them to the anima sensibilis. 
His revival of materialism was followed by Hobbes, Locke and the French materialists, 
and reached the nineteenth century. While the essence of modern materialism began 
with Bacon, Descartes provided its mechanical aspect. Both trends finally converged 
into eighteenth-century materialism.98  
To sum up, these receptions agreed that materialism was potential in Bacon and 
actual in his followers. Bacon’s quasi-materialist philosophy provided the seeds that 
germinated in his followers. However, insofar as the most traditional historiographical 
 
96 One can add here Feuerbach’s claim noted in footnote 66. Feuerbach’s account deserves a separated 
study. 
97 Lange was wrong about the first occurrence of this word. Studies by Olivier Bloch have noted that the 
term “materialism” was coined towards the second half of the seventeenth century. See Bloch, Le 
Matérialisme, ch. 2. 
98 Albert Friedrich Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart, 
2 vols., Iserlohn: Baedeker, 1873, vol. I, pp. 195-197, 199, 201. Cf. English translation, The History of 
Materialism and Criticism of its Present Importance, trans. by Ernest Chester Thomas, 3 vols., London: 




account of early modern philosophy, the so-called “epistemological paradigm,” focused 
on the problem of knowledge, the materialist import of Bacon’s thought has been often 
ignored or disregarded. In current scholarship this paradigm has lost its former 
hegemony, but it has been dominant for such a long time that Bacon’s place in the 
history of philosophy and science has been very often studied in relation the so-called 
“British empiricism.” This explains—at least in part—why Bacon is virtually absent 
from twentieth-century scholarly studies in the history of materialism. This paper 
intends to suggest that Bacon’s thought, his reception and his influence on materialist 
thinkers deserve more attention than they have received during the last decades. That 
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